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An efficient mechanism for cross-border support of  
renewable electricity in the European Union 
Sebastian Buscha,b, Nebojsa Nakicenovica,b, André Ortnerb, Nick Bedardc 
We propose a new mechanism for cross-border support of renewable electricity  in the 
European Union. The guiding idea is that the cross-border mechanism allocates new RES-e 
generating capacity across EU Member States to where it is most valuable. This can, but need 
not coincide with the most cost efficient allocation.  
The mechanism would be designed as an EU wide auction in that Member States and 
generators of RES-e bid prices indicating their willingness to pay for, respectively their costs of 
additional RES-e generating capacity. In addition to prices the auctioneer uses a cross-border 
impact matrix that indicates the spill-over of benefits between Member States induced from 
additional RES-e generating capacity to select the set of bids that maximizes EU-wide surplus. 
We define value as the sum of market and non-market value of RES-e generating capacity net 
of its long-term variable and investment costs of generation. 
The ability to exchange RES-e capacity between EU member states improves the welfare of 
all Member States since potentials and demands for RES-e capacity vary across the EU. This 
notion is reflected in the promotion of so called cooperation mechanisms by the EC. The 
existing mechanisms appear, unfortunately, to be insufficient to facilitate the efficient level of 
trade in capacity across the EU; only a small quantity of energy is expected to be subject to 
cooperation mechanisms (Klessmann et al., 2010). We identify three characteristics of the 
market for RES-e capacity that contribute to the failure of the market as is. First, significant 
information asymmetries exist: the willingness of Member States to pay for RES-e capacity 
and the cost of firms supplying that capacity is the private information of individual Member 
States and RES-e generators respectively. Strategic considerations cause these actors to 
misrepresent this private information in negotiations, leading to inefficient outcomes. The 
mechanism we propose seeks to minimize the incentives for actors to do so. Second, the 
costs and benefits of adding a unit of RES-e capacity are not entirely born by actors making 
the expansion decision; that is, RES-e capacity generates externalities in the market. Bi- or 
multi-lateral negotiations alone are therefore unlikely to result in efficient RES-e capacity. Our 
mechanism incorporates these externalities into prices for capacity ensuring that choices 
reflect the true costs and benefits. Finally, the transaction costs of bi- or multi-lateral 
negotiations are very high since they require parliamentary approval in several states. In 
particular, establishing the share of costs and benefits seems to have derailed cooperation 
between Sweden and Norway (Klessmann et al., 2010). In our mechanism these costs would 
only accrue once for setting-up the mechanism, but then cease to exist for each individual 
project, which offers significant economies of scale. 
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RES-e generators
National governments
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ENTSO-e
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Spatial investment 
problem of RES-e 
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governments
European coordination of investments 
Supply and demand bids
Cross-border impact matrix
Cross-border 
auction
from / to          MS A MS B MS C SUM
MS A 97.72 33.16 28.72 159.60
MS B 28.87 88.37 26.03 143.27
MS C 11.50 11.66 33.48 56.64
MS A 100.06 42.84 45.09 187.98
MS B 29.56 114.15 40.86 184.58
MS C 11.78 15.06 52.55 79.39
MS A 0.00 13.28 33.31 46.58
MS B 0.00 0.00 25.80 25.80
MS C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MS to EU Fund 159.60 143.27 56.64 359.52
EU Fund to MS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MS to EU Fund 159.60 143.27 56.64 359.52
Net PaymentsB
ila
te
ra
l P
ay
m
en
ts
EU
 F
u
n
d
Net Payments
Gross Payments
Payments corrected for surplus 
Gross Payments
Surplus redistributed
to
from
MS A MS B MS C
MS A 0.7 0.15 0.15
MS B … … …
MS C … … …
€/MWh MW €/MWh MW
MS A 40 100 50 200
MS B … … … …
MS C … … … …
Bid1 Bid2
Member State A
Member State B
Member 
State C
70%
15%
15%
